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RECTIFYING FAIR USE AFTER CARIOU V. PRINCE:  
REVIVING THE FORGOTTEN STATUTORY TEXT AND 
REQUIRING THAT UNAUTHORIZED COPYING BE JUSTIFIED, 
RATHER THAN MERELY “TRANSFORMATIVE” 
DANIEL J. BROOKS* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent court decisions, epitomized by the Second Circuit’s majority 
opinion in Cariou v. Prince,1 have applied the fair use doctrine in a manner 
that undermines the rights of copyright owners by permitting wholesale, 
unauthorized appropriation of their works, provided only that the otherwise 
infringing secondary use is perceived—by the judge or judges randomly 
assigned to hear a particular case—as being “transformative.” Applying this 
standard, courts have ruled in favor of appropriators of copyright owners’ 
works. Under Cariou, the determination of transformativeness is based on a 
subjective “side-by-side” comparison of the contents of the original and 
secondary works, without any consideration of the appropriator’s stated 
purpose. This analysis also fails to ask whether it was necessary to borrow 
the particular copyrighted work in the first place, let alone whether it was 
necessary to do so without paying a licensing fee. 
Even though the word “transformative” is not found in the fair use 
statute, it has become a conclusory buzzword supplanting and rendering 
superfluous all of the statutorily enumerated factors, while providing neither 
guidance nor predictability to copyright owners or would-be secondary 
users. By equating transformative use with fair use, the emerging case law 
also imperils the copyright owner’s valuable right to license derivative 
works, such as motion picture versions of books, all of which, by definition, 
are transformative. 
 
 *   Partner, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, counsel to plaintiff Patrick Cariou in Cariou 
v. Prince, a case extensively discussed in this article. B.A. Columbia College, J.D. Yale Law School. The 
opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily of the firm. 
 1.   714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
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This Article discusses how the entrenched and multi-pronged fair use 
doctrine gave way to the unitary “I know it when I see it”2 approach. This 
Article will also discuss a solution to reverse this anomalous trend. The 
solution proposed in this Article—giving effect to the statutory text—would 
provide fair use protection only where there is a sufficient reason for copying 
a particular original work and where, because the market cannot be relied 
upon to allow a socially beneficial transfer of rights, the copying must be 
done without obtaining the copyright owner’s consent. 
II.  THE OBJECTIVES OF COPYRIGHT AND OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE 
Copyright laws confer a limited monopoly in order “to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors.”3 This monopoly protection, 
enacted by Congress under the power granted by the U.S. Constitution,4 
“rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public.”5 “At common 
law, the property of the author . . . in his intellectual creation [was] absolute 
until he voluntarily part[ed] with [it].”6 
The goal of incentivizing creativity and innovation by giving copyright 
holders exclusive rights to their works has long co-existed with the 
recognition that 
[i]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if 
any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original 
throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must 
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used 
before.7 
The fair use doctrine, a judge-made rule developed to accommodate the 
tension between protecting creators of intellectual property and allowing 
others to express themselves by reference to copyrighted works (i.e., 
allowing them to copy those works without permission), “permits courts to 
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would 
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”8 
 
 2.   Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (addressing obscenity 
prosecution). 
 3.   Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 4.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
 5.   Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (quoting Sony, 
464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6.   Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 7.   Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436). 
 8.   Stewart, 495 U.S. at 236 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An overly-rigid 
application of the copyright statute is also mitigated by the rule that an author may not copyright facts or 
4 BROOKS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/16  3:00 PM 
2016] RECTIFYING FAIR USE AFTER CARIOU V. PRINCE 95 
From its infancy, fair use has, in the words of Justice Story, who first 
enunciated the doctrine in this country, involved “the metaphysics of the law, 
where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile and refined, and, 
sometimes, almost evanescent.”9 Nearly a century after Justice Story’s 
formulation, the fair use doctrine remained “the most troublesome in the 
whole law of copyright.”10 
Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, the fair use doctrine 
developed through case law. As stated in one leading case, Rosemont 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., fair use was a “privilege in others 
than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable 
manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the 
owner.”11 The justification for this privilege was found in the constitutional 
scheme itself, which granted “copyright protection in the first instance, to 
wit, ‘To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts.’ U.S. Const. 
art. 1, § 8.”12 “To serve that purpose, ‘courts in passing upon particular claims 
of infringement must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder’s 
interest in a maximum financial return to the greater public interest in the 
development of art, science, and industry.’”13 
Fair use was “a means of balancing the exclusive right of a copyright 
holder with the public’s interest in dissemination of information affecting 
areas of universal concern.”14 In striking this balance through a case-by-case 
approach,15 courts analyzed various factors. 
Fair use was more likely to be found when the secondary use was for a 
non-profit, scientific, or other socially useful purpose “untainted by any 
commercial gain,”16 rather than a purely commercial purpose, such as a 
tobacco company’s use of language from a medical treatise in an 
 
ideas; only the creative “expression” of facts or ideas is protected. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547; see 
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to 
any idea . . . .”). 
 9.   Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). Although Folsom first 
laid out the doctrine’s details, the appellation “fair use” did not appear until Lawrence v. Dana. 15 F. Cas. 
26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136); see Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 10 n.8 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 10.   Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). 
 11.   366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 12.   Id. at 307. 
 13.   Id. (citation omitted). 
 14.   Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall 
St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 15.   Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1361 n.28 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 83, at 29–37 (1967)), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
 16.   Id. at 1354. 
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advertisement.17 Most cases, however, held that the mere circumstance that 
a secondary user “reaps economic benefits” or “is motivated in part by a 
desire for commercial gain” from the reproduction of copyrighted material 
“has no bearing on whether a public benefit may be derived from such a 
work.”18 Indeed, since all works “presumably are operated for profit,” and 
“both commercial and artistic elements are involved in almost every (work),” 
a commercial motive was normally held to be “irrelevant to a determination 
of whether a particular use of copyrighted material in a work which offers 
some benefit to the public constitutes a fair use.”19 To be sure, the secondary 
user’s commercial motivation was not always discounted, especially where 
the original was copied substantially verbatim,20 or where the appropriated 
copyrighted portions were not the subject of the secondary use.21 
Some courts distinguished fair use from copyright infringement by 
differentiating between productive use, which resulted in benefits to the 
public in addition to those produced by the original work, and ordinary use, 
where the copying had the same “intrinsic purpose” as the original.22 The 
utility of this distinction was eroded in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., where the Supreme Court held that it “cannot be wholly 
determinative.”23 The preference for “productive” uses has now been 
restored to some extent by the current emphasis on whether a secondary use 
is “transformative.” Another factor considered by courts was whether 
secondary users needed to take the original copyrighted material in order to 
make their point. If appropriation of the original work was required, a finding 
of fair use was more likely.24 
The nature of the original work also was a factor in the fair use analysis. 
A finding of fair use was less likely if the original work was “creative, 
imaginative, and original,” or if it “represented a substantial investment of 
 
 17.   Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938). 
 18.   Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307; see also New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 
F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977). 
 19.   Id. 
 20.   Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956) (per curiam), aff’d by an equally 
divided court sub nom. Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Loew’s Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). 
 21.   MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that under the law predating 
the 1976 Copyright Act, “if the copyrighted song is not at least in part an object of the parody, there is no 
need to conjure it up.”) 
 22.   See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 970–72 (9th 
Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S 417 (1984). 
 23.   Sony, 464 U.S. at 455, n.40. 
 24.   Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307 (looking to whether the secondary work “requires some use of prior 
materials dealing with the same subject matter”); see also New York Times v. Roxbury Data Interface, 
Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 222 (D.N.J. 1977); Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 
1269, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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time and labor.”25 Courts also considered the amount of the original work 
that was taken, and held that even in parody cases, where it is necessary to 
“conjure up” the original in order to identify the object of the parodist’s 
ridicule,26 excessive copying weighed against fair use.27 Finally, the pre-
1976 Copyright Act cases looked to whether the secondary work was in 
direct competition with the original work and was therefore likely to have an 
adverse effect on the copyright owner’s expectation of gain.28 
The 1976 Copyright Act, in codifying the judge-made fair use doctrine, 
was “‘intended to restate the [pre-existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not 
to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.’”29 
As codified in the 1976 Copyright Act,30 the fair use provision began 
with a preamble, containing examples of secondary uses that had been found 
to be fair uses, and then listed four non-exclusive factors distilled from 
common law cases, which needed to be explored in assessing the fair use 
defense: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include – 
(1)  the purpose and character of the use, including  whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for  nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2)  the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3)  the amount and substantiality of the portion used in  relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4)  the effect of the use upon the potential market for or  value of the 
copyrighted work.31 
 
 25.   MCA, 677 F.2d at 182; see also Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 
91, 96 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 26.   Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964). 
 27.   Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1956). 
 28.   Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310–11; see also Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 
146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 29.   Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976)). 
 30.   17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 31.   These factors paralleled those set forth in Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh. 9 F. Cas. 
342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (“[Courts] must often . . . look to the nature and objects of the 
selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may 
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”). 
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III.  TRANSFORMING THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE 
One way codification failed to change fair use was that application of 
the doctrine remained unpredictable, inconsistent and often result-oriented. 
The codification of fair use in the 1976 Copyright Act provided little 
guidance to copyright owners or secondary users of copyrighted works as to 
what secondary uses were fair. This unpredictability prompted then-District 
Judge Pierre N. Leval to write an article in 1990,32 in which he concluded, 
Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. Earlier 
decisions provide little basis for predicting later ones. Reversals and 
divided courts are commonplace. The opinions reflect widely differing 
notions of the meaning of fair use. Decisions are not governed by 
consistent principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to 
individual fact patterns.33 
Believing that the fair use doctrine “need not be so mysterious or 
dependent on intuitive judgments,” Judge Leval set out to demonstrate that 
“[f]air use should be perceived not as a disorderly basket of exceptions to the 
rules of copyright, nor as a departure from the principles governing that body 
of law, but rather as a rational, integral part of copyright, whose observance 
is necessary to achieve the objectives of that law.”34 Fair use was integral to 
copyright, Judge Leval posited, because “all intellectual creative activity is 
in part derivative” and “important areas of intellectual activity are explicitly 
referential.”35 Accordingly, without the breathing space provided by the fair 
use doctrine, “[m]onopoly protection of intellectual property that impeded 
referential analysis and the development of new ideas out of old would 
strangle the creative process.”36 
Judge Leval’s enduring contribution to the evolution of the fair use 
doctrine is found in his discussion of the first statutory fair use factor, the 
purpose and character of the use, which he believed “raises the question of 
justification.”37 He elaborated: 
I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on 
whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative. The use 
must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different 
manner or for a different purpose from the original. A quotation of 
copyrighted material that merely repackages or republishes the original is 
 
 32.   Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
 33.   Id. at 1106. As Judge Leval pointed out, five of the then-recent leading cases (including two in 
which his own “findings of fair use were rejected on appeal”) “were reversed at every stage of review.” 
Id. at n.9. 
 34.   Id. at 1107. 
 35.   Id. at 1109. 
 36.   Id. 
 37.   Id. at 1111. 
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unlikely to pass the test; in Justice Story’s words, it would merely 
“supersede the objects” of the original. If, on the other hand, the secondary 
use adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, 
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new 
insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair 
use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.38 
IV.   THE SUPREME COURT’S ADOPTION OF THE TRANSFORMATIVE 
USE ANALYSIS 
The Leval article was approvingly cited by the Second Circuit in a case 
holding that a book of abridgments of a popular television series was neither 
transformative nor fair use, and was mentioned in several other opinions .39 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court adopted Judge Leval’s article, 
particularly its discussion of transformative use, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc.,40 which involved an alleged parody of the Roy Orbison rock 
ballad, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” by the rap group 2 Live Crew. 
A.  The Examples in the Preamble 
The Supreme Court noted that the examples of fair use listed in the 
preamble (“for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching . . . scholarship, or research”)41 were “illustrative and not 
limitative,” and provided “only general guidance about the sorts of copying 
that courts and Congress most commonly found to be fair uses.”42 Rather 
than jettisoning the examples in the preamble, the Court, in discussing the 
first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes,”43 stated that the “enquiry here may be guided by the examples 
given in the preamble to § 107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, 
or comment, or news reporting, and the like.”44 
 
 38.   Id. 
 39.   Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1375, 1376 (2d Cir. 1993); see 
also New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting the 
article); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Leval, J.); Basic 
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing article for 
proposition that merely repackaging copyrighted material is neither productive nor transformative). 
 40.   510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 41.   17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 42.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78. 
 43.   17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
 44.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79. 
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B.   The First Factor—Purpose and Character of the Use and Its 
Commerciality 
The Supreme Court, in analyzing the “purpose and character” prong of 
the first fair use factor and borrowing Judge Leval’s reasoning, held the 
central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s words, 
whether the new work merely “supersede[s] the objects” of the original 
creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work 
is “transformative.”45 
Then, in addressing the other prong of the first factor—whether the 
secondary use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes—the Court concluded that “the more transformative the new work, 
the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that 
may weigh against a finding of fair use.”46 
The Court retreated from its earlier language in Sony v. Universal City 
Studios, which held that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs 
to the owner of the copyright,”47 and declared “[t]he language of the statute 
makes clear that the commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work 
is only one element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and 
character.”48 As the Court stated, “If, indeed, commerciality carried 
presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the presumption would 
swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of 
§ 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, 
and research, since these activities ‘are generally conducted for profit in this 
country.’”49 
Critically, Campbell was a parody case. In its discussion of the first fair 
use factor, the Court held that “parody has an obvious claim to 
transformative value,” and that “parody, like other comment or criticism, 
may claim fair use under § 107.”50 To qualify as fair use, the Court explained, 
2 Live Crew’s alleged parody needed to be a commentary on the original that 
somehow held it up to ridicule.51 The Court continued, 
 
 45.   Id. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 32, at 1111). 
 46.   Id. 
 47.   464 U.S. at 451. 
 48.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. 
 49.   Id. (citation omitted). 
 50.   Id. at 579. 
 51.   Id. at 580. 
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If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on the 
substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer 
merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up 
something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work 
diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the 
extent of its commerciality, loom larger.52 
To qualify as fair use, therefore, a claimed parody has to actually target 
an original work, rather than being, in the words of the concurring opinion, 
a “commercial takeoff . . . rationalized post hoc as a parody.”53 According to 
the Court, “[t]he threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of 
parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.”54 It 
ultimately concluded that “2 Live Crew’s song reasonably could be 
perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree.”55 
The opinion did not explicitly identify the reasonable observer to whom this 
claim of parody had to be perceivable (e.g., whether it was the average music 
listener, the average person who listens to rap music, or nine Supreme Court 
justices who probably do not). Nor did it specify whether the “reasonably 
perceivable” standard applied, or should apply, in non-parody cases. 
C.  The Second Factor—The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
Turning to the second fair use factor, “the nature of the copyrighted 
work,”56 the Court stated that this factor recognizes “that some works are 
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the 
consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works 
are copied.”57 The Court held that a “creative expression for public 
dissemination,” such as the Roy Orbison song, “falls within the core of the 
copyright’s protective purposes.”58 Stressing, however, that 2 Live Crew’s 
secondary use was found to be a parody, the Court determined that the 
second factor was neutral and “not much help in this case . . . since parodies 
almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”59 While  
parodies, by definition, normally mock well-known works, the Court did not 
explain why parodies would “almost invariably” target “expressive works,” 
as opposed to less creative, mundane works, which are nevertheless 
 
 52.   Id. 
 53.   Id. at 600 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 54.   Id. at 582. 
 55.   Id. at 583. 
 56.   17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
 57.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 58.   Id. 
 59.   Id. 
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copyrightable and potentially trigger infringement claims and fair use 
defenses if they are copied, as long as they possess “some minimal degree of 
creativity.”60 
D.  The Third Factor—Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
Discussing the third fair use factor, “the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,”61 the Court 
stressed that the amount used had to be “reasonable in relation to the purpose 
of the copying.”62 This, in turn, required examination of the “persuasiveness” 
of the “justification for the particular copying done, and the enquiry will 
harken back to the first of the statutory factors, for, as in prior cases, we 
recognize that the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and 
character of the use.”63  As with its discussion of the second factor, the 
Court’s analysis of the third factor pivoted on its finding that the secondary 
use was a parody. After reiterating the general rule that substantial copying, 
particularly of “the heart” of an original work, weighs against fair use, the 
Court declined to apply that rule to parody, stating, 
Parody presents a difficult case. Parody’s humor, or in any event its 
comment, necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its object 
through distorted imitation. Its art lies in the tension between a known 
original and its parodic twin. When parody takes aim at a particular 
original work, the parody must be able to “conjure up” at least enough of 
that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable.64 
The Court concluded that 2 Live Crew took no more of the lyrics than was 
necessary to parody the original work and that the lower court had erred in 
holding that the third factor tilted against fair use.65 
 
 60.   Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). (“To be sure, the requisite 
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.”). 
 61.   17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
 62.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 63.   Id. at 586–87. 
 64.   Id. at 587–88 (basing its conclusion that a parody must “conjure up . . . distinctive or 
memorable features” of the original work on a line of parody cases) (citing Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he concept of ‘conjuring up’ an original came into 
the copyright law . . . as a recognition that a parody frequently needs to be more than a fleeting evocation 
of an original in order to make its humorous point”); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(“Like a speech, a song is difficult to parody effectively without exact or near-exact copying. If the would-
be parodist varies the music or meter of the original substantially, it simply will not be recognizable to 
the general audience. This ‘special need for accuracy,’ provides some license for ‘closer’ parody.”). 
 65.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589, 594. 
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E.   The Fourth Factor—Effect of the Use upon the Potential Market 
In addressing the fourth fair use factor, “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,”66 the Court stated that 
courts were required “to consider not only the extent of market harm caused 
by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the 
defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential 
market’ for the original.”67 The Court added that this “enquiry ‘must take 
account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market for 
derivative works.’”68 
The Court stated that when “the second use is transformative, market 
substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily 
inferred.”69 In the case of parody, harm to the market for the original work 
was unlikely, because a parody does not serve as a “substitute” for the 
original work (“supersed[ing] [its] objects”);70 on the contrary, “the parody 
and the original usually serve different market functions.”71 Nor was it likely 
that a derivative market for parodies of “Oh, Pretty Woman” was harmed, 
because 
[t]he market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators 
of original works would in general develop or license others to develop. 
Yet the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical 
reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the 
very notion of a potential licensing market.72 
However, the Court found there was another potential derivative market 
that could have been harmed—the market for non-parodic rap versions of 
“Oh, Pretty Woman.”73 Because “fair use is an affirmative defense” in which 
the burden of proof lies with the party asserting the defense, 2 Live Crew 
had to show the absence of harm to the “market for rap derivatives.”74 
Neither party introduced any evidence on the likely impact of the parody on 
the potential rap market and the issue was remanded, because the Court 
found that “it is impossible to deal with the fourth factor except by 
recognizing that a silent record on an important factor bearing on fair use 
 
 66.   17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 67.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (citations omitted). 
 68.   Id. (citation omitted). 
 69.   Id. at 591. 
 70.   Id. (quoting Leval, supra note 32, at 1125). 
 71.   Id. 
 72.   Id. at 592. 
 73.   Id. at 592–93. 
 74.   Id. at 590. 
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disentitled the proponent of the defense, 2 Live Crew, to summary 
judgment.”75 
Even an absence of harm to the potential market for the original 
copyrighted work was not a “guarantee of fairness.”76 On this point, the 
Court relied on a footnote in Judge Leval’s article: “Judge Leval gives the 
example of the film producer’s appropriation of a composer’s previously 
unknown song that turns the song into a commercial success; the boon to the 
song does not make the film’s simple copying fair.”77 The Court cautioned 
that the fourth factor, “no less than the other three, may be addressed only 
through a ‘sensitive balancing of interests.’”78 The Court again departed from 
one of its prior decisions—specifically, its statement in Harper & Row that 
the fourth factor “is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use,”79—when it emphasized that “[m]arket harm is a matter of degree, and 
the importance of this factor will vary, not only with the amount of harm, but 
also with the relative strength of the showing on the other factors.”80 
V.  THE INTERPRETATION OF CAMPBELL IN CARIOU V. PRINCE 
As a result of the Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou v. Prince81 and 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc. (which adopted 
Cariou’s approach),82 fair use threatens to swallow the rights of copyright 
owners to prevent unauthorized copying of their works in at least those two 
circuits. This is important because the Ninth and Second Circuits are the 
homes to major art centers and to the motion picture, television, music, 
technology, fashion and publishing industries. These decisions have 
imperiled copyright holders’ rights, particularly the exclusive right to license 
derivative works, by extending Campbell’s analysis, much of which relied 
 
 75.   Id. at 594. 
 76.   Id. at 590 n.21. 
 77.   Id. (citing Leval, supra note 32, at 1124 n.84). Judge Leval stated: 
Although the market factor is significant, the Supreme Court has somewhat overstated its 
importance. When the secondary use does substantially interfere with the market for the 
copyrighted work, as was the case in [Harper & Row], this factor powerfully opposes a 
finding of fair use. But the inverse does not follow. The fact that the secondary use does 
not harm the market for the original gives no assurance that the secondary use is justified. 
Thus, notwithstanding the importance of the market factor, especially when the market is 
impaired by the secondary use, it should not overshadow the requirement of justification 
under the first factor, without which there can be no fair use. 
Leval, supra note 32, at 1124. 
 78.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 n.21 (citation omitted). 
 79.   Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 80.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590, n.21. 
 81.   Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d. Cir. 2013). 
 82.   Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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upon the peculiar nature of parodies, to cases involving non-parodic copying 
and by replacing the elaborate statutory fair use structure with a singular 
focus on one word: “transformative.” Significantly, the word transformative 
does not even appear in the text of the copyright statute’s fair use provision.83 
The transformative use standard has also become entirely subjective, 
dependent on the predilections of the particular judge or judges randomly 
assigned to a case. It further offers neither coherence nor guidance to 
copyright owners or potential secondary users. 
A.  Factual Background of Cariou 
Patrick Cariou, a professional photographer, published a copyrighted 
book of black-and-white photographs, portraits of Rastafarians and tropical 
landscapes, which he took over the course of six years in Jamaica. Richard 
Prince, a well-known “appropriation artist,” used Cariou’s work without 
permission and created thirty collage paintings, which featured images torn 
from Cariou’s book. These images from Cariou’s book were sometimes 
displayed in their entirety, sometimes enlarged and partially painted over, 
and sometimes added to images appropriated from other sources.84 The 
Gagosian Gallery in New York exhibited these paintings, where eight of 
them were sold for a total of $10,480,000 and seven others were exchanged 
for valuable art created by well-known artists.85 
In his deposition, Prince testified that he had “no interest in the original 
meaning” of Cariou’s photographs, did not have a “message” he was 
communicating through his art, and “did not intend to comment on any 
aspects of [Cariou’s photographs] or on the broader culture.” Rather, his 
intent was to pay homage to certain other painters and “to create beautiful 
artworks which related to musical themes and to a post-apocalyptic 
screenplay he was writing.”86 
B.  The Examples in the Preamble 
In the district court, the defendants contended that Prince’s 
appropriation art was “akin” to the examples “identified in the preamble to 
§ 107” and constituted fair use per se. The district court rejected that 
argument, holding that the preambular examples 
 
 83.   See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 84.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699–700. 
 85.   Id. at 709. 
 86.   Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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all have at their core a focus on the original works or their historical 
context, and all of the precedent this Court can identify imposes a 
requirement that the new work in some way comment on, relate to the 
historical context of, or critically refer back to the original works.87 
Because Prince’s own testimony showed that he was not commenting on, 
putting into historical context, or criticizing Cariou’s work, the district court 
held that he lacked transformative intent.88 
The Second Circuit, reversing in part and remanding the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in Cariou’s favor, declined to use the preambular 
examples, reasoning that 
[t]he law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the original or 
its author in order to be considered transformative, and a secondary work 
may constitute a fair use even if it serves some purpose other than those 
(criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research) 
identified in the preamble to the statute.89 
The court’s refusal to examine whether Prince’s appropriation art was akin 
to the examples in the preamble ignored Campbell’s suggestion that the 
analysis of the first fair use factor “may be guided by the examples given in 
the preamble to § 107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, or 
comment, or news reporting, and the like.”90 
C.  The First Factor—Purpose and Character of the Use and its 
Commerciality 
1.   The View of the Majority 
Examining the first fair use factor, the purpose and character of the use, 
the Second Circuit majority discarded the district court’s finding that 
Prince’s deposition testimony showed that he lacked a transformative 
purpose91 and held that Prince’s failure to “explain and defend his use as 
transformative” was “not dispositive.”92 In the majority’s view, rather than 
considering the secondary user’s stated purpose, it was critical to examine 
the content of the secondary work: “What is critical is how the work in 
question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might 
say about a particular piece or body of work.”93 Accordingly, the majority 
 
 87.   Id. at 348–49. 
 88.   Id. at 349. 
 89.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706 (citations omitted). 
 90.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994). 
 91.   Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
 92.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707. 
 93.   Id. 
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concluded, “Rather than confining our inquiry to Prince’s explanation of his 
artworks, we instead examine how the artworks may ‘reasonably be 
perceived’ in order to assess their transformative nature.”94 
Following the “instructive” lead of a then-recent Seventh Circuit 
decision, Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners,95 in which, as 
“viewed side-by-side,” an episode of South Park was a clear parody of the 
original work,96 the majority in Cariou concluded that “‘the only two pieces 
of evidence needed to decide the question of fair use’” were the original and 
secondary works.97 Applying that standard, and “looking at the artworks and 
the photographs side-by-side,” the majority held that twenty-five of the thirty 
paintings were transformative as a matter of law, because they “have a 
different character, give Cariou’s photographs a new expression, and employ 
new aesthetics with creative and communicative results distinct from 
Cariou’s.”98 
The majority elaborated on its perception that twenty-five of the thirty 
paintings were transformative, because they had a different observable 
character than Cariou’s original photographs: “Where Cariou’s serene and 
deliberately composed portraits and landscape photographs depict the 
natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, Prince’s crude 
and jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and provocative.”99  The 
paintings also were “between ten and nearly a hundred times the size of the 
photographs.”100 Finally, “Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color 
palette, and media are fundamentally different and new compared to the 
photographs, as is the expressive nature of Prince’s work.”101 
The twenty-five paintings, which the majority perceived to be 
transformative, were found to be fair use, but the case was remanded for the 
five remaining paintings, which did “not sufficiently differ from the 
photographs of Cariou’s that they incorporate for us confidently to make a 
determination about their transformative nature as a matter of law.”102 By 
doing so, it allowed the district court to apply “the proper standard,” so that 
 
 94.   Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582). 
 95.   682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 96.   Id. at 692. 
 97.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707 (quoting Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 690). 
 98.   Id. at 707–08. 
 99.   Id. at 706. 
 100.   Id. 
 101.   Id. 
 102.   Id. at 710–11. 
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the district court could make the fair use determination “in the first 
instance.”103 
The majority gave short shrift to the commerciality prong of the first 
factor, stating, “Although there is no question that Prince’s artworks are 
commercial, we do not place much significance on that fact due to the 
transformative nature of the work.”104 This holding, despite the inability of 
the majority to determine whether five of the paintings were transformative 
(and fair use) or infringing, demonstrates that the commerciality prong of the 
first factor—which Campbell labeled as “one element of the first factor 
enquiry into its purpose and character”105—has been written out of the 
statute. 
2.  The View of the Partial Dissent 
Judge Wallace, of the Ninth Circuit, and sitting by designation, filed an 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. His opinion took issue with 
the majority’s treatment of the first fair use factor, including the refusal to 
consider Prince’s testimony concerning his own purpose. He noted that, 
while  testimony of this sort might typically be “self-serving,” earlier Second 
Circuit cases nevertheless relied on such statements.106 Significantly, in one 
of those cases, Blanch v. Koons, Jeff Koons, another well-known 
contemporary artist, submitted an affidavit explaining that his intent in 
appropriating an advertisement from a glossy fashion magazine was to 
“comment” on the impact of slick fashion photography on popular culture.107 
In contrast to its disregard of Prince’s testimony, which was against his own 
interest and, therefore, inherently reliable, the court in Blanch found fair use 
and relied heavily on Koons’ self-serving affidavit. The court stated, “[W]e 
need not depend on our own poorly honed artistic sensibilities. Koons 
explained, without contradiction, why he used Blanch’s image . . . .”108 
The partial dissent also parted company with the majority over its view 
derived from Brownmark that “all the Court needs to do here to determine 
transformativeness is view the original work and the secondary work and, 
apparently, employ its own artistic judgment.”109 While Brownmark was a 
 
 103.   Id. at 712. 
 104.   Id. at 708. 
 105.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). 
 106.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 713 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Blanch 
v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 
(2d Cir. 1998)). 
 107.   Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255. 
 108.   Id. 
 109.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 713 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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“clear case of parody”—so clear that fair use “was evident from even a 
‘fleeting glance’ at the original and secondary works”—the 
transformativeness of Prince’s works could not “be so readily 
determined.”110 Judge Wallace would have remanded the entire case for a 
review by the district court of all thirty artworks, stating, “[W]hile I admit 
freely that I am not an art critic or expert, I fail to see how the majority in its 
appellate role can ‘confidently’ draw a distinction between the twenty-five 
works that it has identified as constituting fair use and the five works that do 
not readily lend themselves to a fair use determination.”111 
The partial dissent asked, “If the district court is in the best position to 
determine fair use as to some paintings, why is the same not true as to all 
paintings? Certainly we are not merely to use our personal art views to make 
the new legal application to the facts of this case.”112 Judge Wallace alluded 
to Justice Holmes’ often-cited admonition,113 as quoted in Campbell: “‘[I]t 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits.’”114 
D.  The Second Factor—The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
While acknowledging that Cariou’s work was creative, the Second 
Circuit, quoting Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,115 
discounted this factor, because “just as with the commercial character of 
Prince’s work, this factor ‘may be of limited usefulness where,’ as here, ‘the 
creative work of art is being used for a transformative purpose.’”116 This 
argument originates from Campbell, where the Supreme Court held that the 
second factor was “not much help” in a parody case, “since parodies almost 
invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.”117 
However logical it may be that a parody normally must ridicule a well-
known and recognizable work, it does not follow that parodies, let alone non-
parodic “transformative works,” must invariably mock creative or 
expressive, as opposed to banal, works. The Court in Cariou relied on Bill 
 
 110.   Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 111.   Id. 
 112.   Id. at 713–14. 
 113.   Id. at 714. 
 114.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.)). 
 115.   448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 116.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710 (quoting Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd.,  448 F.3d 
605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 117.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
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Graham Archives118 as authority for the sweeping proposition that, even 
where parody is not involved, the use of a creative work for a transformative 
purpose does not disfavor fair use. The Court also relied on Campbell, which 
concluded that the creativity of the original work is irrelevant whenever there 
is a transformative secondary use. This conclusion rests upon a non sequitur 
since, even if, as stated in Campbell, parodies normally target creative works, 
there is no reason that a transformative use defined as adding “something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message,”119 could not do so to an original work 
lacking in creativity. 
By interpreting Campbell to remove creative works from the core of 
intended copyright protection where they have been “transformed,” the 
Second Circuit has effectively eliminated the second fair use factor in any 
case where there is a “transformative” secondary use, no matter how creative 
and deserving of protection the original work may be.120 
E.  The Third Factor—Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
Once again forcing the square peg of parody into the round hole of 
transformative use, the Cariou court, paraphrasing Campbell, held that “[t]he 
secondary use ‘must be [permitted] to “conjure up” at least enough of the 
original’ to fulfill its transformative purpose.”121 Thus, even though “[m]any 
of Prince’s works use[d] Cariou’s photographs . . . in whole or substantial 
part” and without “alter[ing] the source photograph[s] very much at all,” the 
third factor favored fair use, because “in twenty-five of his artworks, Prince 
transformed those photographs into something new and different and, as a 
result, this factor weighs heavily in Prince’s favor.”122 
The language from Campbell paraphrased in Cariou actually stated: 
“When parody takes aim at a particular original work, the parody must be 
able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original to make the object of its 
critical wit recognizable.”123 Prince, of course, was not attempting to make 
Cariou’s anonymous photographs recognizable; he was just using them as 
raw materials. Thus, the analogy of 2 Live Crew’s alteration of the famous, 
 
 118.   See 448 F.3d at 612. 
 119.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 120.   Cf. id. at 586 (holding that creative works fall “within the core of the copyright’s protective 
purposes.”). 
 121.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588) (emphasis added by Second 
Circuit majority). 
 122.   Id. 
 123.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
4 BROOKS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/16  3:00 PM 
2016] RECTIFYING FAIR USE AFTER CARIOU V. PRINCE 111 
iconic Roy Orbison song in Campbell is inapt. Further, the majority found 
some of Prince’s paintings were transformative precisely because “the entire 
source photograph is used but is also heavily obscured and altered to the 
point that Cariou’s original is barely recognizable.”124 
The circularity of this reasoning is apparent. While a parodist must be 
able to conjure up enough of an original work to make it recognizable enough 
for the audience to know what is being ridiculed, there is no reason a 
transformative secondary user who is not commenting on an original work 
must be permitted to conjure up a sufficient portion of that work to make it 
recognizable, or “barely recognizable.” By extending the “conjure up” 
principle developed over many years in a line of parody cases to non-parodic 
appropriation, Cariou renders the third fair use factor meaningless and 
superfluous whenever a judge subjectively believes that a secondary work is 
“transformative.” 
F.   The Fourth Factor—Effect of the Use upon the Potential Market 
The Court  stated that “‘our concern is not whether the secondary use 
suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or its potential 
derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original 
work.’”125 To determine whether Prince’s paintings usurped Cariou’s 
market, the Second Circuit looked to two factors: the comparative price 
points of the original and secondary works and the respective audiences for 
those works. 
The court noted that Cariou did not aggressively market his work, sold 
only a handful of prints from the book to personal acquaintances, and the 
book, which was out-of-print, earned only $8,000 in royalties.126 Prince, on 
the other hand, sold some of the paintings for “two million or more dollars” 
and his work “appeal[ed] to an entirely different sort of collector than 
Cariou’s.”127 The Court focused on the invitation list for a dinner hosted by 
the Gagosian Gallery for the opening of Prince’s show, which 
included a number of the wealthy and famous such as the musicians Jay-
Z and Beyonce Knowles, artists Damien Hirst and Jeff Koons, 
professional football player Tom Brady, model Gisele Bundchen, Vanity 
 
 124.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710. 
 125.   Id. at 708 (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added by 
Second Circuit majority). Blanch, in turn, was quoting from NXIVM Corporation v. Ross Institute, a case 
in which there was no cognizable market harm because the copying was done in order to criticize and 
expose the copyright holder as a cult, rather than to usurp the quoted materials. 364 F.3d 471, 481–82 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
 126.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699, 709. 
 127.   Id. at 709. 
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Fair editor Graydon Carter, Vogue editor Anna Wintour, authors Jonathan 
Franzen and Candace Bushnell, and actors Robert DeNiro, Angelina Jolie, 
and Brad Pitt.128 
Also, eight of Prince’s artworks sold for a total of $10,480,000 and seven 
others were exchanged “for works by painter Larry Rivers and by sculptor 
Richard Serra.”129 
Seemingly bedazzled by this glittering array of celebrities, the Court 
overlooked the absence of any evidence that any of them even attended the 
dinner, let alone purchased any of the artworks. Conversely, the Court, in 
assuming that “Prince’s audience is very different from Cariou’s,”130 largely 
disregarded the district court’s finding that a gallery owner was planning to 
put on a show of 30 to 40 of Cariou’s prints, with multiple copies to be sold 
“at prices ranging from $3,000.00 to $20,000.00, depending on size.” The 
Court also seemed to disregard the evidence that Cariou’s book was to be 
reprinted for a book signing during the show, but that the gallery owner 
discontinued those plans upon learning of Prince’s show, “because she did 
not want to appear to be capitalizing on Prince’s Paintings and did not want 
to show work which had been ‘done already’ at the nearby Gagosian 
Gallery.”131 
The Second Circuit dismissed this finding, substituting its own finding 
that although the gallery owner admittedly decided not to put on the show 
because it had been “done already,”132 her true motivation was that “she 
mistakenly believed that Cariou had collaborated with Prince on the 
Gagosian show.”133 Whatever the merits of the Second Circuit’s finding, it 
fails to take into account the plausibly overlapping audiences for the two sets 
of works, or, even if the audiences were distinct, the palpable harm to 
Cariou’s market, because he lost a potential outlet due to Prince’s 
infringement. 
As to potential harm to a derivative market, Cariou departs from 
Campbell in two ways. First, while Campbell concluded that “the derivative 
market for rap music is a proper focus of enquiry,”134 the Cariou majority 
stated, “Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the application of this 
factor does not focus principally on the question of damage to Cariou’s 
 
 128.   Id. 
 129.   Id. 
 130.   Id. 
 131.   Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 132.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 704. 
 133.   Id. at 709. 
 134.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994). 
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derivative market.”135 Second, Cariou shifted the burden of proof, finding a 
lack of harm to Cariou’s derivative market because “[t]here is nothing in the 
record to suggest that Cariou would ever develop or license secondary uses 
of his work in the vein of Prince’s artworks.”136 Resolving the absence of 
evidence on this point against Cariou is directly contrary to Campbell’s 
holding that the proponent of fair use had the burden of proof on the issue of 
harm to the potential rap derivative market: “[A] silent record on an 
important factor bearing on fair use disentitled the proponent of the defense, 
2 Live Crew, to summary judgment.”137 
VI.   THE FLAWS IN THE TRANSFORMATIVE USE STANDARD 
A.   A Consensus on the Application of the Standard Remains Elusive 
Judge Leval’s seminal article was motivated, in part, by his view that 
judges “do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use,” resulting in 
numerous “[r]eversals and divided courts,” and decisions that “are not 
governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive 
reactions to individual fact patterns.”138 Twenty years after the adoption of 
Judge Leval’s reasoning by the Supreme Court in Campbell, fair use remains 
plagued by an absence of consensus, frequent reversals, divided courts, and 
a failure to uniformly apply the standard. 
In addition to the reversal and partial dissent in Cariou, other recent 
leading fair use decisions involve reversals and divided courts, with the 
disagreement hinging on whether the secondary use was transformative.139 
 
 135.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708. 
 136.   Id. at 709. 
 137.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594. 
 138.   Leval, supra note 32, at 1106. 
 139.   See Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1185–88 (9th Cir. 2012) (Smith, J., 
dissenting) (disagreeing with majority, which reversed district court’s finding of fair use, as to whether 
magazine’s use of photographs qualified as news reporting and was transformative); Bouchat v. Balt. 
Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 320–21 (4th Cir. 2010) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with 
majority, which reversed district court’s finding of fair use, as to whether Baltimore Ravens’ depiction of 
the “Flying B” logo in highlight films was transformative); Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 
1385 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority, which reversed finding of fair 
use by court of federal claims, as to whether postage stamp of the Korean War Veterans Memorial was 
transformative because, as found by the trial court, it had a “new and different character” and depicted a 
“surrealistic environment with snow and subdued lighting where the viewer is left unsure whether he is 
viewing a photograph of statues or actual human beings.”). Cf. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 262 (2d. 
Cir. 2006) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (parting company with the majority’s discounting of the 
commercial nature of the secondary use where that use is not for one of the “archetypal purposes” 
specifically contemplated in the preamble to § 107 and noting that “consideration of a use’s commercial 
nature (unlike its ‘transformativeness’) is explicitly part of our statutory mandate”) 
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Inter-circuit disagreements are also prevalent. On a basic level, while 
the Second Circuit considers the first factor inquiry into transformativeness 
to be “‘the heart of the fair use inquiry,”140 the Seventh Circuit has questioned 
Campbell’s endorsement of the transformative use standard. Thus, in Ty, Inc. 
v. Publications International Ltd.,141 a Seventh Circuit panel remarked that 
copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that 
nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a 
substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes 
for pegs or screws), or for derivative works from the copyrighted work, . . . 
is not fair use.142 
The Ty court went on to state that this “distinction between complementary 
and substitutional copying” is “sometimes—though as it seems to us, 
confusingly—said to be between ‘transformative’ and ‘superseding’ 
copies.”143 
More recently, in Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC,144 the Seventh Circuit 
downplayed the importance of the transformative use standard, contending 
that the Supreme Court had only “mentioned it” in Campbell: 
The district court and the parties have debated whether the t-shirts are a 
“transformative use” of the photo—and, if so, just how “transformative” 
the use must be. That’s not one of the statutory factors, though the 
Supreme Court mentioned it in [Campbell]. The Second Circuit has run 
with the suggestion and concluded that “transformative use” is enough to 
bring a modified copy within the scope of §107.145 
Kienitz then took aim at the Second Circuit’s elevation of 
transformativeness: “We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach, because asking 
exclusively whether something is ‘transformative’ not only replaces the list 
in §107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. §106(2), which protects derivative 
works.”146 
Kienitz not only conflicts with the Second Circuit’s focus on 
transformativeness, but also with other circuits as to the importance of the 
fourth factor. Kienitz contends that courts should “stick with the statutory 
list, of which the most important usually is the fourth (market effect).”147 
 
 140.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705 (quoting Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251). 
 141.   292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 142.   Id. at 517. 
 143.   Id. at 518. 
 144.   766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 145.   Id. at 758. 
 146.   Id. The danger that the transformative use standard will render superfluous the copyright 
owner’s right to create and license derivative works (which are, by statutory definition, transformative) 
is addressed infra Section V.B. 
 147.   Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758. 
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This view of the market effect’s pre-eminent importance was the view 
expressed in Harper & Row, which described the market effect as 
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,”148 but this view 
was  moderated by Campbell.149 Other circuits appear not to share the 
Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on the primacy of the market effect. In Gaylord 
v. United States, for instance, the Federal Circuit reversed a finding of fair 
use even though the copyright owner had suffered no market harm.150 
Similarly, in Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 
the Ninth Circuit quoted Judge Leval’s article for the proposition that, while 
“the market factor is significant,” especially when the “secondary use does 
substantially interfere with the market for the copyrighted work, . . . the 
inverse does not follow” and the “fact that the secondary use does not harm 
the market for the original gives no assurance that the secondary use is 
justified.”151 Even plaintiffs lacking any present desire or ability to sell their 
copyrighted works have prevailed in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits over a fair 
use defense on the grounds that the copying could adversely affect their 
potential markets in the event that they later changed their minds.152 
Finally, while the Second Circuit cases have banished the 
commerciality prong of the first fair use factor whenever the secondary use 
is “transformative,”153 Sixth and Ninth Circuit decisions continue to adhere 
to Sony’s admonition that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs 
to the owner of the copyright.”154 
 
 148.   Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. at 539, 566 (1985). 
 149.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590, n.21 (1994) (“Market harm is a matter 
of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary, not only with the amount of harm, but also with the 
relative strength of the showing on the other factors.”) 
 150.   Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 151.   227 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Leval, supra note 32, at 1124) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 152.   See Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2012); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 
688 F.3d 1164, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 153.   See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 154.   Balsley, 691 F.3d at 760 (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 451 (1984)); Monge, 688 F.3d at 1176 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451). 
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B.  The Transformative Use Standard Eviscerates the Copyright 
Owner’s Exclusive Right to Authorize the Making of Derivative Works 
Based upon the Copyrighted Work 
 
One of the important exclusive rights conferred upon copyright owners 
is the right to create or authorize others to create “derivative works.”155 The 
Copyright Act defines a “derivative work,” as “a work based upon one or 
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”156 
In contrast to the statutory fair use provision found in § 107, which 
never employs the word “transformative,” the statutory definition of a 
derivative work expressly speaks of an original work being “transformed.” 
Determining fair use, therefore, based on transformativeness—consistent 
with Judge Leval’s theory that the first fair use factor requires a 
“justification” for copying and that the justification is supplied when the 
secondary use is “transformative”157—carries with it, at the very least, the 
potential for confusion, as recognized by the Second Circuit.158 
To qualify as a derivative work, a work must be “independently 
copyrightable” and original. For a derivative work to be original, it must have 
“at least some substantial variation” from the underlying work and its 
“original aspects” must “be more than trivial.”159 In criticizing Cariou as “a 
 
 155.   17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
 156.   17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 157.   Leval, supra note 32, at 1111. 
 158.   See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(noting “potential source of confusion in our copyright jurisprudence over the use of the term 
‘transformative’” but asserting that “[a]lthough derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright 
transform an original work into a new mode of presentation, such works—unlike works of fair use—take 
expression for purposes that are not ‘transformative’”). More recently, in Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 
the Second Circuit stated, “The statutory definition suggests that derivative works generally involve 
transformations in the nature of changes of form.” 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 
101) (emphasis in original). “By contrast, copying from an original for the purpose of criticism or 
commentary on the original or provision of information about it, tends more clearly to satisfy Campbell’s 
notion of the ‘transformative’ purpose involved in the analysis of Factor One.” Id. at 215–16. Derivative 
works “ordinarily are those that re-present the protected aspects of the original work, i.e., its expressive 
content, converted into an altered form, such as the conversion of a novel into a film, the translation of a 
writing into a different language . . . or other similar conversions.” Id. at 225 (internal citation omitted). 
 159.   Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 990 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted); see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.03[A], 3-8, 3-9-
3-10 (2014) (holding that to qualify as a derivative work, “the additional matter injected in a prior work, 
or the manner of rearranging or otherwise transforming a prior work, must constitute more than a minimal 
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high water mark in the application of the transformative use doctrine to 
eviscerate section 106(2)’s derivative right,” one leading treatise noted that 
the Cariou court’s 
expansive characterization of fair use necessarily implied a narrow 
conception of the derivative right: “Our conclusion should not be taken to 
suggest, however, that any cosmetic changes to the photographs would 
necessarily constitute fair use. A secondary work may modify the original 
without being transformative. For instance, a derivative work that merely 
presents the same material but in a new form, such as a book of synopses 
of television shows, is not transformative.”160 
As Professor Goldstein explained, the Cariou majority’s conclusion 
that twenty-five of Prince’s paintings were transformative as a matter of law, 
because they have a “different character, give Cariou’s photographs a new 
expression, and employ new aesthetics with creative and communicative 
results distinct from Cariou’s”161 was “a description that could equally apply 
to the production of a great many acknowledged derivative works, such as a 
music video adapted from a series of photographs, a motion picture adapted 
from a novel, or a musical drama adapted from a play.”162 As an example, 
Professor Goldstein pointed to Stewart v. Abend,163 where the Supreme Court 
held that the performance of the Alfred Hitchcock film, Rear Window, “was 
not a fair use of the story, It Had to Be Murder, on which it was based,” even 
though the producers of the film argued that “the story constituted only 20% 
of the motion picture’s story line.”164 Further, there was no fair use of the 
story “even though the film possessed an aesthetic and a sensibility that 
distinguished it from the underlying story.”165 
Another leading copyright treatise, Nimmer on Copyright, noted 
Cariou’s pinched view of the derivative work right, labeling Cariou 
“[e]mblematic of the almost limitless expansion of cases holding uses 
transformative,” and explicitly referred to the majority’s description of the 
transformative nature of Prince’s paintings, stating, 
It would be shocking for a studio to get away with spurning a license for 
the novel that it portrays in film, on the basis that it took a serene literary 
work and portrayed it in a crude and jarring fashion that was projected on 
 
contribution” and “[i]n general, the applicable standard in determining the necessary quantum of 
originality is that of a ‘distinguishable variation’ that is more than ‘merely trivial.’”) (citations omitted). 
 160.   2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.2.2.1(c), at 12:37, 12:38 n.78.7 (3d ed. 
Supp. 2014) (quoting Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
 161.   Id. at 12:38 (quoting Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708). 
 162.   Id. at 12:38. 
 163.   495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990). 
 164.   Id. at 238. 
 165.   2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 12:38 n.78.7. 
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a screen over a hundred times larger than the underlying work. Yet the 
majority’s logic in this case leads to just that conclusion.166 
Again alluding to the Cariou majority’s analysis of transformativeness, the 
treatise continued, 
Moreover, the hypothetical film inevitably must also incorporate 
“composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and media [that] are 
fundamentally different and new compared to the” book being dramatized; 
but those considerations, in the past, have never led to the blanket 
conclusion that it is fair use to produce an unauthorized film version of a 
literary composition.167 
While all of the exclusive rights listed in § 106 of the Copyright Act are 
subject to the fair use provision codified in § 107, the broad sweep of the 
transformative use standard, by fallaciously equating all transformative uses 
with fair uses, saps away the meaning of the right to create or license 
derivative works since those works, by definition, transform the preexisting 
works upon which they are based.168 The Seventh Circuit recognized this 
fallacy in Kienitz, stating, 
[t]o say that a new use transforms the work is precisely to say that it is 
derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected under §106(2). Cariou 
and its predecessors in the Second Circuit do not explain how every 
‘transformative use’ can be ‘fair use’ without extinguishing the author’s 
rights under §106(2).169 
Because the expansive view of transformative use extinguishes the statutory 
right to create and license derivative works, Cariou and its ilk “violate the 
canon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would 
render another provision superfluous.”170 
 
 166.   4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 159, at § 13.05[B][6], 13-224.16. 
 167.   Id. (quoting Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
 168.   All of the examples in the definition of “derivative works” mesh with Campbell’s definition 
of a transformative secondary work as one that “adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). While this is more obviously true with some examples (e.g., motion 
picture versions), taking the first example in the definition, a translation, Nimmer notes that “every sizable 
translation” will embody “distinguishable variations” from the original and that, with different 
translations of the same original work, “differences in nuance will invariably result.” See 1 NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 159, at § 3.03[A], 3-13 n.26.9. That is because “‘the art of translation involves 
choices among many possible means of expressing ideas . . . .’” Id. at p.3-14 (quoting Merkos L’Inyonei 
Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2002)). Moreover, contrary to the 
statement in Castle Rock, that derivative works that transform original works “take expression for 
purposes that are not ‘transformative,’” a translation clearly has a transformative purpose: to enable 
someone who cannot read a particular language to read and comprehend a written work in another 
language. Cf. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 169.   Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 170.   Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010). 
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C.  The Transformative Use Standard, by Discarding the Statutory 
Text and Relying Entirely upon Judges’ Subjective Observations, Produces 
Arbitrary, Incoherent and Result-Oriented Outcomes 
While paying lip service to the preamble and to the four fair use factors, 
the cases employing the transformative use standard have increasingly 
neutered the statutory text, resulting in a finding of fair use whenever, in the 
subjective opinion of the judge or judges assigned to the case, the secondary 
work is deemed to be “transformative.”171 These cases offer neither 
predictability nor guidance to copyright owners or potential secondary users. 
Judge Leval noted that “important areas of intellectual activity are 
explicitly referential” and “[m]onopoly protection of intellectual property 
that impeded referential analysis . . . would strangle the creative process.”172 
The examples in the preamble to § 107 of the Copyright Act—criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research—are all 
“referential.” In other words, those endeavors all focus on and use 
copyrighted materials for a reason. Yet the courts in Cariou and similar cases 
pay no attention to the preambular examples and treat them as strictly 
illustrative.173 The courts in these cases ignore Campbell’s suggestion that 
the fair use analysis “may be guided by the examples given in the preamble 
to § 107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, or comment, or news 
reporting, and the like.”174 
As a result, the Cariou majority never explored why Prince had to use 
Cariou’s specific photographs, even though he considered them to be 
generic175, as opposed to other available equivalent materials. Nor, in Seltzer 
v. Green Day, did the Ninth Circuit ever examine why the plaintiff’s Scream 
Icon street graffiti drawing, which said nothing about religion, had to be used 
by the defendants, with a large red spray-painted cross over the middle of the 
screaming face, as “raw material” in the construction of a video backdrop for 
a song by the rock band Green Day about the hypocrisy of religion.176 
 
 171.   As Nimmer points out, applications of the transformative use standard have been 
“conclusory—they appear to label a use ‘not transformative’ as a shorthand for ‘not fair,’ and 
correlatively ‘‘transformative’ for ‘fair.’ Such a strategy empties the term of meaning—for the 
‘transformative’ moniker to guide, rather than follow, the fair use analysis, it must amount to more than 
a conclusory label.” 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 159, at § 13.05[A][1][b], 13-170. Nimmer added, 
“As one commentator laments, ‘the transformative use standard has become all things to all people.’” Id. 
(citation omitted). 
 172.   Leval, supra note 32, at 1109. 
 173.   Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 174.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994). 
 175.   Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 176.   Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1173–77 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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The first fair use factor—the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes—has been all but obliterated. Although an appropriator’s stated 
purpose for using someone else’s copyrighted work had always been 
considered important,177 the Cariou majority disregarded Prince’s testimony, 
which negated any transformative intent on his part, and instead looked at 
“how the work in question appears to the reasonable observer.”178 The 
majority stated, “Rather than confining our inquiry to Prince’s explanation 
of his artworks, we instead examine how the artworks may ‘reasonably be 
perceived’ in order to assess their transformative nature.”179 
The context in which the Supreme Court in Campbell asked whether 2 
Live Crew’s parody could reasonably be perceived was, however, quite 
different from the context in Cariou. In Campbell, 2 Live Crew’s stated 
purpose was to create a parody of the work.180 In asking whether the character 
of the song could reasonably be perceived as a parody, the Court merely 
satisfied itself that the claimed parody was not a post hoc rationalization.181 
Therefore, Campbell considered  2 Live Crew’s stated purpose, and the 
observable character of the song. The Cariou court, in contrast, narrowed the 
first fair use factor—the purpose and character of the use—to a singular 
inquiry, asking only whether Prince’s paintings had a transformative 
character, without any regard to Prince’s purpose. 
Such an approach was a departure from prior cases, which focused on 
whether the secondary user had a transformative purpose, and not on 
determining whether the content of the original work had been 
transformed.182 The Cariou majority’s refusal to take Prince’s stated purpose 
 
 177.   See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (holding The 
Nation Magazine’s stated purpose was to scoop President Ford’s forthcoming memoirs, both in book 
form and as excerpted in Time Magazine); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d. Cir. 2006) 
(illustrating a case where the artist Jeff Koons claimed that his purpose in appropriating an advertisement 
from a glossy fashion magazine was to comment on the impact of slick fashion photography on popular 
culture); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing the 
trivia book about Seinfeld, where the creators stated their purpose was to satisfy readers’ between-episode 
cravings). 
 178.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707. 
 179.   Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582). 
 180.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572. 
 181.   Id. at 582 (“The threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a 
parodic character may reasonably be perceived.”). 
 182.   R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J. L. & 
ARTS 467, 484–85 (2008) (examining cases through 2007); see Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing fair use finding after disagreeing with lower court, which concluded 
stamp was a “transformative work, having a new and different character and expression” than the Korean 
War Veterans Memorial, and holding that “both the stamp and the [Memorial] share a common purpose 
to honor veterans of the Korean War”); see also 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 12:38 (“Perhaps 
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into account drew criticism from the partial dissent, which believed that 
Prince’s testimony should be considered. The dissent did not believe that “all 
the Court needs to do here to determine transformativeness is view the 
original work and the secondary work and, apparently, employ its own 
artistic judgment.”183 Judge Wallace, in his partial dissent, also “fail[ed] to 
see how the majority in its appellate role can ‘confidently’ draw a distinction 
between the twenty-five works that it has identified as constituting fair use 
and the five works that do not readily lend themselves to a fair use 
determination.”184 
Nimmer joined in this criticism, stating, 
It is also difficult to differentiate the 25 works determined to be fair use as 
a matter of law from the 5 that were remanded, as both categories portray 
the same iconic image captured by Cariou, covered by lozenges and 
surrounded by naked [women] supplied by Prince.185 
The criticism was amply justified, as seen by two of Prince’s paintings: 
 
  
  
Charlie Company Back to the Garden 
 
The painting shown above and to the left, Charlie Company, was 
remanded to the district court, because the majority could not “confidently” 
 
recognizing that the [transformative use standard] . . . could seriously undermine the derivative right, 
some lower courts have skirted the risk by focusing not on the content of the allegedly infringing work, 
but on its purpose.”) 
 183.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 713 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 184.   Id. 
 185.   4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 159, at § 13.05[B][6], 13-224.16. 
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determine whether it was transformative. The virtually identical, albeit 
smaller, painting on the right, Back to the Garden, was determined to be 
transformative as a matter of law, although the majority opinion contains no 
discussion of that particular painting.186 There is no principled basis for this 
distinction. 
The Court in Campbell did not clarify who the reasonable observer of 
original and secondary works is supposed to be. Neither did the Court in 
Cariou, although the reasonable observer clearly cannot be the average 
museum or gallery visitor, because that hypothetical person would not be 
seeing Cariou’s “serene” original photographs and Prince’s “crude and 
jarring” paintings “side-by-side.”187 That visitor would only be seeing 
Prince’s “hectic and provocative” works188 and would not see the original 
works or know whether, or to what degree, they had been “transformed.” 
The reasonable observer also cannot be the jury, since summary judgment 
was granted in favor of Prince and Gagosian Gallery with respect to twenty-
five paintings. It would appear, therefore, that the reasonable observers were 
the two judges in the majority, who agreed that twenty-five of the paintings 
were transformative. 
The Cariou majority not only eliminated consideration of Prince’s 
purpose from the first fair use factor’s calculus, but also declined to take into 
account the obviously commercial nature of the secondary works, 
discounting the significance of the commerciality prong of the first factor 
“due to the transformative nature of the work.”189 Thus, the first fair use 
factor—which, in the Second Circuit, is “the heart of the fair use 
inquiry”190—has been hollowed out and reduced to a subjective evaluation, 
by randomly-assigned judges, of whether the expressive character of the 
secondary work may “reasonably be perceived” to be “transformative.” 
As to the second and third fair use factors—the nature of the 
copyrighted work and the amount and substantiality of the portion used, 
respectively—Cariou relied on Campbell —which minimized the 
importance of those factors in a parody case for reasons that were specifically 
 
 186.   Cariou, 714 F.3d 710–11; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cariou v. Prince, No. 13-261, 
2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3474, at *App. 108 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2013) (containing the images of the 
paintings in Appendix F to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari that was filed by Patrick Cariou but denied 
by the Court). 
 187.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706–07. 
 188.   Id. at 706. 
 189.   Id. at 708. 
 190.   Id. at 705 (quoting Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251). 
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applicable to parody—to hold that those factors may be disregarded 
whenever a secondary use is “transformative.”191 
Turning to the fourth fair use factor, the Cariou court stated that it was 
not concerned about “whether the secondary use suppresses or even destroys 
the market for the original or its potential derivatives,” but only “whether the 
secondary use usurps the market of the original work.”192 As with its 
elimination of the preambular examples, the purpose and commerciality 
elements of the first factor, and the second and third factors in their entirety, 
Cariou’s approach to the market harm factor was narrowed by the concept 
of transformativeness: “Conducting this analysis, we are mindful that ‘[t]he 
more transformative the secondary use, the less likelihood that the secondary 
use substitutes for the original.’”193 Not surprisingly, under this formulation, 
the court found that there was no usurpation of Cariou’s market, because 
Cariou and Prince had different markets, different audiences and different 
price points.194 
Even assuming, however, that the celebrities on Gagosian Gallery’s 
invitation list, or, more importantly, the well-heeled collectors who bought 
Prince’s paintings, would not have been interested in Cariou’s book of 
photographs or prints, it hardly follows that the gallery owner’s decision to 
discontinue plans for Cariou’s show when she became aware of the Prince 
show at the nearby Gagosian Gallery caused no harm to Cariou’s market. 
Cariou’s market still could have been harmed, because other potential buyers 
might have attended that show, bought prints or the reprinted book, and 
spread the word to other potential buyers. There is no basis for concluding 
that a secondary use can only harm the market for the original, or its 
derivatives, if the secondary use usurps a precisely identical use that the 
copyright owner would have pursued.195  Significantly, the fair use statute 
describes the fourth factor as looking to “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work[,]” and not whether the 
 
 191.   Id. at 710. 
 192.   Id. at 708 (citation omitted) (emphasis added by Second Circuit majority). 
 193.   Id. at 709 (quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d 
Cir. 1998)). 
 194.   Id. at 699, 709. 
 195.   See Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that a politician’s 
unauthorized use of a copyrighted song in his campaign could harm the copyright owner, who was himself 
neither considering running for office nor allowing other political candidates to use the song, because 
“licensees and advertisers do not like to use songs that are already associated with a particular product or 
cause”). The parallel to the gallery owner in Cariou, who discontinued plans for a show of Cariou’s prints 
“because she did not want to appear to be capitalizing on Prince’s Paintings and did not want to show 
work which had been ‘done already’ at the nearby Gagosian Gallery” is unmistakable. See Cariou, 784 
F. Supp. 2d at 344, 353. 
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secondary use completely usurps, supplants or supersedes the market for the 
original.196  Similarly, Justice Story’s seminal formulation of the fourth fair 
use factor referred to “the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or 
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”197 
Once again, the Cariou court’s crabbed view of the fair use factors, 
particularly the fourth factor, has been criticized by Nimmer: 
[I]f a novelist were about to sign a contract with a studio to make her 
bestseller into a blockbuster motion picture, only to discover that a rival 
studio had beat them both to the punch by distributing its own 
unauthorized film version, surely there would be an effect on the potential 
market for the novel that is cognizable under the fourth factor. It would 
scarcely mitigate that harm to point out that the film’s audience may be 
very different from the novelist’s. Moreover, that the first studio might 
have mistakenly concluded that the novelist had licensed its rival studio 
would in no way diminish the harm that plaintiff had suffered to her 
potential market.198 
The version of fair use in which all that matters is the subjective views 
of judges as to whether secondary uses are reasonably perceivable as 
“transformative” inevitably brings with it other subjective predilections that 
can lead to result-oriented decisions. By way of example, in Cariou, the 
majority shifted the burden of proof, deciding against Cariou for not 
presenting evidence as to whether he “would ever develop or license 
secondary uses of his work in the vein of Prince’s artworks.”199 This ran afoul 
of Campbell, where the Court imposed upon 2 Live Crew, the proponent of 
the affirmative defense of fair use, the burden of establishing that there was 
no harm to a potential derivative market—there, the market for rap versions 
of the Orbison song.200 
Judges’ subjective preferences should not enter into the fair use 
analysis. Where one panel may be star-struck by an artist’s wealthy patrons, 
another may be repulsed. In Cariou, Nimmer believed that “[s]trangely, 
rather than recognizing plaintiff’s legitimate copyright interests, this opinion 
all but punished plaintiff for his anonymity, concomitantly rewarding 
defendant for rubbing shoulders with the glitterati.”201 On the other hand, 
diametrically opposed to Cariou, the court in a pre-Campbell case, Rogers 
v. Koons, penalized the artist Jeff Koons for his commercial success, stating, 
 
 196.   17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 197.   Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (emphasis added). 
 198.   4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 159, at § 13.05[B][6], 13-224.16. 
 199.   Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709. 
 200.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590, 594 (1994). 
 201.   4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 159, at § 13.05[B][6], 13-224.17. 
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The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that defendants resolved so 
long as they were significant players in the art business, and the copies 
they produced bettered the price of the copied work by a thousand to one, 
their piracy of a less well-known artist’s work would escape being sullied 
by an accusation of plagiarism.202 
The fair use analysis should neither reward nor punish secondary users based 
on their proximity to wealth and fame. Thus, a more objective fair use 
standard is needed. 
As Nimmer concluded regarding Cariou: “In short, it is difficult to 
know what metric the court was applying in blessing art appropriation as 
transformative usage,” but 
this case seemingly expands transformative usage without limit—as long 
as the duplication is not 100%, it may ‘move[] the work in a different 
direction’ that thereby qualifies as fair use. It would seem that the 
pendulum has swung too far in the direction of recognizing any alteration 
as transformative, such that this doctrine now threatens to swallow fair 
use. It is respectfully submitted that a correction is needed in the law.203 
VII.  A SECONDARY USE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED ONLY 
WHERE THE SECONDARY USER NEEDS TO COPY A PARTICULAR ORIGINAL 
WORK FOR SOME REASON AND NEEDS TO DO SO WITHOUT HAVING TO 
ACQUIRE A LICENSE  
 
Fair use can be rectified by moving away from the idea that 
unauthorized copying is justified whenever the secondary work is 
transformative. Instead, the court should only find justification where the 
secondary user needs to copy an original work for a specific reason, and 
needs to do so without the copyright owner’s consent, for market reasons. 
Employing this objective market-based approach takes guidance from the 
fair use statute’s preambular examples and restores meaning to all four fair 
use factors. 
A.  A Market-Based Approach 
Quintessential examples of fair use, many falling within the categories 
listed in the preamble to the fair use provision, “would not be possible if 
users always had to negotiate with copyright proprietors. Many copyright 
owners would block all parodies, for example, and the administrative costs 
 
 202.   Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 203.   4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 159, at § 13.05[B][6], 13-224.16, 13-224.18 (quoting 
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 711). 
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of finding and obtaining consent from copyright holders would frustrate 
many academic uses.”204 When, however, the market functions efficiently, 
fair use is not necessary, because the market can and should be relied upon 
to facilitate socially desirable transfers of copyrights to secondary users who 
will maximize the value of those rights. 
Thus, in Harper & Row, the Supreme Court rejected the fair use defense 
asserted by The Nation Magazine, which had scooped and published 
excerpts of President Ford’s memoirs, stating, “Economists who have 
addressed the issue believe the fair use exception should come into play only 
in those situations in which the market fails or the price the copyright holder 
would ask is near zero.”205 Fair use was not necessary in Harper & Row, due 
to the “fully functioning market that encourages the creation and 
dissemination of memoirs of public figures. In the economists’ view, 
permitting ‘fair use’ to displace normal copyright channels disrupts the 
copyright market without a commensurate public benefit.”206 
In the view of Professor Gordon, one of the authorities cited by Harper 
& Row, markets do not always function adequately and sometimes fail “to 
mediate public interests in dissemination and private interests in 
remuneration.”207 Fair use, in her opinion, should be restricted to those 
instances where the secondary user cannot negotiate a license with the 
copyright owner, and “courts should limit their grants of fair use to those 
occasions in which the market cannot be relied upon to allow socially 
beneficial uses to occur.”208 In this way, “fair use [permits] uncompensated 
transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation through 
the market.”209 According to another commentator, 
Fair use limits the rights of the copyright holder by allowing unauthorized 
copying in circumstances that are roughly consistent with promoting 
economic efficiency. One such circumstance involves high transaction 
costs . . .  [which] [could] prevent an otherwise beneficial exchange from 
taking place.210 
 
 204.   Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal parentheses 
omitted). 
 205.   Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 n.9 (1985). 
 206.   Id. 
 207.   Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613 (1982). 
 208.   Id. at 1620–21. 
 209.   Id. at 1601. 
 210.   William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic 
Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 10 (2000). 
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As Professor Goldstein asserted, the four fair use factors, tracing their 
lineage back to Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh,211 are intended 
to determine when “an undisputed statutory right should nonetheless be 
withheld for reasons of transaction costs or social benefit,”212 because “[a] 
central aim of fair use is to promote uses of copyrighted works in situations 
where transaction costs would otherwise disable them.”213 
B.  Taking Guidance from the Examples in the Preamble 
In Folsom, Justice Story gave an example of fair use, positing that “no 
one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, 
if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair 
and reasonable criticism.”214 Modern courts and commentators have 
articulated the justification for this paradigmatic example of fair use. 
The Seventh Circuit explained that book reviewers did not have to 
obtain an author’s consent before copying from the book being reviewed, 
because 
[q]uite apart from the impairment of freedom of expression that would 
result from giving a copyright holder control over public criticism of his 
work, to deem such quotation an infringement would greatly reduce the 
credibility of book reviews, to the detriment of copyright owners as a 
group . . . .215 
Requiring consent would also impair a socially beneficial use: 
Book reviews would no longer serve the reading public as a useful guide 
to which books to buy. Book reviews that quote from (‘copy’) the books 
being reviewed increase the demand for copyrighted works; to deem such 
copying infringement would therefore be perverse, and so the fair-use 
doctrine permits such copying.216 
As Professor Landes explained, the same is true of a review of an art 
exhibition that reproduces copyrighted images from the show being 
reviewed. Such use “will provide useful information to consumers that, on 
average, will tend to expand the demand for the underlying works. Moreover, 
if the law required the reviewer to obtain the artist’s consent to reproduce 
these images, readers would have less confidence in the objectivity of the 
review.”217 
 
 211.   9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
 212.   2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 12:36. 
 213.   Id. at 12:34. 
 214.   Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344. 
 215.   Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 216.   Id. 
 217.   Landes, supra note 210, at 10. 
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Reviews of books, art exhibitions, or any other creative work clearly 
illustrate the validity of the market-based approach to fair use for the 
following reasons: (1) the reviewer, for optimum treatment of the subject, 
needs to copy from the original work in order to make the review useful for 
the public; and (2) the copying needs to be without consent, because if 
copyright owners could pick and choose between reviewers, the reviews 
would lose their credibility, and therefore, their utility. Requiring consent 
from the copyright owner in this area would impose an insuperable 
transaction cost that would disable the socially beneficial activity of 
criticism. 
Parody, like a review, is also a form of comment or criticism, fitting 
within the preamble to § 107, and has a strong claim to fair use, because the 
parodist needs to “conjure up” the original work in order to insure the 
audience will recognize the work that is being ridiculed. Copyright owners, 
however, will be unlikely to license mocking portrayals of their own work.218 
Therefore, according to Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, “There is 
an obstruction when the parodied work is a target of the parodist’s criticism, 
for it may be in the private interest of the copyright owner, but not in the 
social interest, to suppress criticism of the work.”219 Where copyright owners 
are reluctant to license secondary works “not for economic gain but to 
control the flow of information” and to avoid having their works criticized, 
there is “a type of market failure” that favors extending fair use treatment to 
the parody or other critical work.220 In the case of a parody which targets the 
parodied work, the parodist needs to copy the particular work being ridiculed 
and needs to do so without obtaining consent, since a license will be 
unavailable, even though the humorous send-up has a social benefit. 
Fair use is similarly justified in cases of non-parodic political or cultural 
criticism, where attacking an opposing point of view often can be most 
effectively accomplished through copying, and a license from the copyright 
owner will be unavailable. Therefore, it was fair use to copy a publicity 
photograph in a pro-nuclear energy advertisement depicting “a woman [dairy 
farmer] and a cow standing framed against a blue sky with fluffy clouds in a 
field of yellow clover,” with a text claiming that the farmer values nuclear 
energy as a way to keep the air clean and the milk fresh, while describing a 
harmonious relationship with the nearby nuclear power plant, “to criticize 
 
 218.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994); Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation 
LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 219.   Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUDIES 67, 73 (1992) 
(emphasis removed). 
 220.   Gordon, supra note 207, at 1633. 
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efforts by the power industry to promote a sunny view of nuclear energy in 
the public forum,” with the photograph providing “a perfect illustration of 
those efforts.”221 It also was fair use to use a clip from John Lennon’s iconic 
song, Imagine, envisioning a world without religion, in a film juxtaposing 
marching soldiers and an image of Stalin, in order to show that secular 
utopian views are naïve and ultimately result in dictatorship.222 In both of 
these cases, the original work perfectly illustrated the secondary user’s point 
and copying without consent was acceptable, since a license would not have 
been granted. 
Where, however, the original work is being used as a “weapon” rather 
than a “target,” such as in a satire using a copyrighted work to make fun of 
a genre or society, fair use is problematic.223 As noted in Campbell, “Parody 
needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use 
the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas 
satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very 
act of borrowing.”224 With satire, because the object of ridicule is not the 
copyright owner or her work, a voluntary transaction is less unlikely, and 
alternative equivalents may well be available. As Professor Landes 
explained, 
The economic rationale for this distinction rests on the idea of high 
transaction costs preventing a value maximizing exchange. When the 
parody targets the plaintiff’s work, the parties are unlikely to come to 
terms on a price that allows the defendant to make fun [of], embarrass, or 
even humiliate the plaintiff’s work. But such a use may provide substantial 
benefits to third parties.225 
In the case of a satire, where the original work is used as a weapon, the case 
for fair use is much weaker: “On the other hand, if the defendant uses the 
parodied work as a weapon to comment on society, he should have little 
trouble licensing the work. Moreover, if the copyright holder refuses, he can 
come to terms with another copyright holder of an equally usable work.”226 
This distinction between parody and satire again demonstrates that for a 
work to qualify as fair use, the secondary user must have a need to copy the 
 
 221.   Baraban v. Time Warner, Inc., 99 Civ. 1569 (JSM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4447, at *2, *6–7 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2000). 
 222.   Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 322–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 223.   Posner, supra note 219, at 73, 77–78. 
 224.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994). 
 225.   Landes, supra note 210, at 21. 
 226.   Id. 
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particular original work and must also have a need to do so without obtaining 
the copyright owner’s consent, since a license is unlikely to be available.227 
Other preambular examples, such as teaching, scholarship and research, 
involve potentially willing licensors, but insurmountable transaction costs in 
locating and bargaining with them. In all of these instances, which benefit 
the public, “the confluence of two variables is likely to produce a market 
barrier: high transaction costs and low anticipated profits.”228 Like 
scholarship, which would not be feasible if a licensing fee had to be paid to 
every quoted source, teaching, not only faces prohibitively high transaction 
costs, but also practical obstacles. Whether the copies for classroom use are 
photocopied or included in a PowerPoint presentation, “‘[t]he inspiration and 
decision to use the work and the moment of its use for maximum teaching 
effectiveness are so close in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a 
timely reply to a request for permission.’”229 
Similarly, research, while socially beneficial, tends to have transaction 
costs, such as locating and bargaining with multiple copyright owners, that 
are “prohibitively high” compared to the profit to be made.230 In Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp., an Internet search engine “crawled” the web to capture 
images and make low-resolution thumbnail versions available as a means of 
indexing and improving access to those images.231 Because the defendant did 
not sell or license the low-resolution thumbnails, the profits were limited to 
advertising revenues on its website, which would likely be inadequate to pay 
for licenses for the thousands of images the search engine made available.232 
Requiring an Internet search engine to pay licensing fees to all of the 
copyright owners whose works were displayed in order to facilitate research 
by third parties would vitiate this activity even though it serves a public 
interest, and benefits the copyright owners themselves.233 
 
 227.   Application of this standard would probably require a different result in Blanch, where Jeff 
Koons satirically used an advertisement from a glossy fashion magazine to comment on society and the 
effect of slick fashion photography on public perceptions and admitted he could have used an alternative 
image in his painting. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247, 248, 254–55 (2d Cir. 2006). On the other 
hand, parodic depictions of the iconic Barbie doll in nude, sexualized poses with kitchen appliances would 
be fair use, as found in Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions. 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 228.   Gordon, supra note 207, at 1628; Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 
2014) (“[T]he administrative costs of finding and obtaining consent from copyright holders would 
frustrate many academic uses.”). 
 229.   Gordon, supra note 207, at 1628 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at 65, 69 (1976)). 
 230.   Id. at 1618. 
 231.   336 F.3d 811, 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 232.   Id. at 816, 821–22. 
 233.   To be sure, if the putative research tool is, in fact, copying the original materials excessively 
in order to exploit their aesthetic virtues, rather than serving as a guide, justification is lacking and fair 
use should be denied. See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 544, 547–48 
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Some courts, both before and after Cariou, have approved unauthorized 
copying that enables users to search for information on the grounds that a 
transformative purpose is being served. Kelly itself emphasized that the 
search engine served a different function or purpose than the original 
aesthetic works.234 The same reasoning was applied in Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., where a search engine’s copying of website images in 
order to create an Internet search index was transformative because, unlike 
the original works, which had “an entertainment, aesthetic, or informative 
function,” the search engine “transforms the image into a pointer directing a 
user to a source of information.”235 
Two post-Cariou Second Circuit decisions have taken the same 
approach as the Ninth Circuit in Kelly and Perfect 10. In Authors Guild, Inc. 
v. HathiTrust, the Second Circuit held that the systematic digitization of 
copyrighted books by several research universities had a transformative 
purpose, because the digital copies were used to create a full-text searchable 
database that supplied users with lists of page numbers and not with copies 
of the original works. The court found this database with solely the page 
numbers served a different purpose than the original works.236 And, in 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., the Second Circuit recently approved as 
fair use Google’s agreements with several major research libraries to 
digitally copy tens of millions of books in their collections and create a 
database of books and text available for online searching through the use of 
“snippets.”237 This database was considered fair use because Google’s book 
project expanded public access to books, without serving as a substitute that 
could be used actually to read the books in their entirety.238 As the Court 
held, “Google’s making of a digital copy to provide a search function is a 
transformative use, which augments public knowledge by making available 
information about Plaintiffs’ books without providing the public with a 
substantial substitute for matter protected by the Plaintiffs’ copyright 
interests in the original works or derivatives of them.”239 
It seems evident, however, that secondary uses such as these, which 
further the underlying purpose of copyright, to promote learning, and which 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (defendant’s “Lexicon,” a tool for searching Harry Potter novels, borrowed excessively 
and without restraint from the originals, exploiting their expressive value, rather than merely serving as 
a research tool). 
 234.   Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819–20. 
 235.   508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 236.   Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 237.   Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 238.   Id. at 207–08. 
 239.   Id. at 207 (emphasis in original). 
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only increase demand for the original copyrighted works, should qualify as 
fair use whether or not they are “transformative.” As the Eleventh Circuit 
held in Cambridge University Press v. Patton, the unauthorized, but 
noncommercial and educational, verbatim copying of scholarly works by a 
university for use by its students through a system of digital delivery over 
the Internet tilted the first fair use factor in favor of fair use, even though the 
copying was not transformative and served the very same purpose as the 
original works (providing reading material for students in university 
courses).240 As the court concluded, “Defendants’ use of Plaintiffs’ works is 
of the nonprofit educational nature that Congress intended the fair use 
defense to allow under certain circumstances. Furthermore, we find this 
sufficiently weighty that the first factor favors a finding of fair use despite 
the nontransformative nature of the use.”241 This result is aligned, not with 
the transformative use doctrine, but with the Seventh Circuit’s observation 
that “the administrative costs of finding and obtaining consent from 
copyright holders would frustrate many academic uses.”242 
This reasoning should apply as well to certain uses that are more 
commercial, such as Google’s book digitization project, where it would not 
have been feasible to locate and obtain consent from the authors (or from the 
authors’ heirs, as appropriate) of tens of millions of books. Given the 
enormous transaction costs inherent in such an undertaking, which benefits 
readers and copyright owners alike, fair use should permit the unauthorized 
copying. 
The final example in the preamble, news reporting, aptly demonstrates 
the requirement that the secondary user must have a need to copy the 
particular original work. While news outlets obviously cannot be required to 
pay licensing fees, or else they would lose their credibility and face 
prohibitively high transaction costs, news reporting is not fair use per se.243 
For news reporting to qualify as fair use, there must be a valid reason for the 
copying of copyrighted materials. In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court 
stated, “In evaluating character and purpose we cannot ignore The Nation’s 
stated purpose of scooping the forthcoming hard-cover and Time 
abstracts.”244 Thus, even though The Nation was reporting “news,” and the 
 
 240.   769 F.3d 1232, 1262–63, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 241.   Id. at 1267. 
 242.   See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 243.   Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (holding that news 
reporting is not presumptively fair use and “[t]he fact that an article arguably is ‘news’ . . . is simply one 
factor in a fair use analysis”). 
 244.   Id. at 562. 
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article became news in and of itself after The Nation published excerpts from 
President Ford’s memoirs that were about to be published in Time Magazine, 
The Nation’s use was not fair use.245 
Harper & Row is consistent with fair use being available only where 
the secondary user has a need to copy. Given the “fully functioning market” 
for memoirs of public figures,246 there was no such need, and The Nation’s 
copying was unjustified. The same was true in two recent cases involving a 
fair use defense based on news reporting. In Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 
a magazine’s publication of copyrighted photographs of a celebrity’s 
clandestine wedding, which arguably qualified as news because the 
photographs disproved the celebrity’s denials that the wedding ever took 
place, was not justified as news reporting, because there was no need to use 
the photos, given the public availability of the celebrity’s marriage 
certificate.247 In Balsley, Hustler Magazine’s publication of a nude 
photograph of a female news anchor, which had earlier resulted in her being 
fired from a previous job, as part of a feature on “Hot News Babes,” did not 
qualify as fair use, because “the incident giving rise to the picture was three 
years old and no longer considered newsworthy.”248 
Conversely, in Núñez v. Carribean International News Corp., an 
existing controversy regarding whether it was appropriate for Miss Puerto 
Rico Universe to have posed for nude modeling photographs, the court 
justified publication of the photos as part of a news article, because “the 
pictures were the story” and “[i]t would have been much more difficult to 
explain the controversy without reproducing the photographs.”249 Unlike the 
magazines in Monge and Balsley, the newspaper in Núñez had a need to 
publish copyrighted photographs, and its fair use defense was accordingly 
upheld. 
C.  Restoring Meaning to All Four Fair Use Factors 
There are certainly disputed secondary uses that do not fit neatly into 
the examples contained in the preamble of § 107. Regardless of the nature of 
the underlying use, however, application of this same market-based standard 
will restore the meaning that has been leeched out of the four fair use factors 
 
 245.   Id. at 561. 
 246.   Id. at 566 n.9. 
 247.   688 F.3d 1164, 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 248.   Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 754–55, 759 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 249.   235 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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and import other important considerations, therefore facilitating resolution 
of any fair use claim. 
The first factor, the purpose and character of the use and its 
commerciality, has been reduced to a subjective inquiry into whether the 
secondary use may reasonably be perceived as having an expressive 
character that is “transformative.” Focusing the inquiry instead on why the 
secondary user took the original work, and requiring a reason for the 
appropriation will restore the relevance of the secondary user’s purpose, 
which, unlike “transformativeness,” is explicitly required in the first 
factor.250 
Of course, there will be cases where the secondary user cannot explain 
his purpose. For example, in Dauman v. The Andy Warhol Foundation for 
the Visual Arts, Inc., the secondary user died before the lawsuit was 
instituted.251 In such cases, it may nevertheless be possible to discern the 
purpose, but in any event, in contrast to the majority’s approach in Cariou, 
when there is sworn testimony from the appropriator as to his own purpose, 
that evidence is critically important and should never be ignored.252 
Commerciality is also an explicit element of the first fair use factor’s 
statutory text and should no longer be disregarded.253 This prong of the first 
factor, which has been abrogated by the transformative use standard, will be 
revived if the fair use analysis focuses on whether the secondary user has a 
valid reason for not seeking consent due to high transaction costs. Whether 
a secondary use “is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes” is not a moral judgment; instead, this prong recognizes that, in the 
case of works that “have a higher value and consume more resources[,] . . . 
transaction costs will consequently pose less of a barrier to their 
production . . . .”254 Thus, in cases, such as Blanch and Cariou, where the 
likely profit far exceeds the transaction cost of securing a license, there is no 
 
 250.   Cabining fair use by requiring that there must be a reason for the copying gives heed to Judge 
Leval’s observation that “important areas of intellectual activity are explicitly referential.” Leval, supra 
note 32, at 1109. This requirement is also consistent with Justice Story’s admonition that fair use requires 
“intellectual labor and judgment” and not just “the facile use of the scissors.” Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 
342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
580 (1994) (holding a claim to fairness in borrowing is diminished if the alleged infringer merely uses 
the original work “to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh”); Kienitz v. 
Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The fair-use privilege under §107 is not 
designed to protect lazy appropriators.”). 
 251.   96 Civ. 9219 (TPG), 1997 WL 337488 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1997). 
 252.   See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
 253.   See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 262 (2d Cir. 2006) (Katzmann, J., concurring) 
(“[C]onsideration of a use’s commercial nature (unlike its ‘transformativeness’) is explicitly part of our 
statutory mandate.”) 
 254.   2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 12:35; Gordon, supra note 207, at 1639. 
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justification for bypassing the market. This justification especially does not 
apply where the secondary user considers the original work to be generic, as 
both Koons and Prince did, and the market for equivalent original works is 
well-functioning, as is the market for stock photographs.255 Conversely, 
where the secondary use is personal and not commercial, such as time-
shifting recorded television programming in one’s home,256 any transaction 
cost is likely to preclude the activity, militating in favor of a finding of fair 
use.257 
The second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, is now 
moribund, because, under cases like Cariou, whenever the disputed use is 
“transformative,” the second factor becomes irrelevant. By asking whether, 
based on the nature of the original work, there is a justification for copying 
it without consent, instead of whether the secondary use is transformative, 
relevance can be restored to this factor. For example, even if a work is 
creative, there can be a justification for copying it if the work is iconic and 
unique. As Professor Goldstein explained, “Where the work in issue is 
undeniably—and entirely—creative, but possesses iconic, newsworthy 
stature because of its creator or context, a court may tip this factor toward 
fair use.”258 A case like Lennon v. Premise Media, involving the use of a clip 
from John Lennon’s iconic song, Imagine, imagining a world without 
religion, to make a point about the importance of religion, illustrates this 
concept.259 Similarly, in Bill Graham Archives, a biography of the Grateful 
Dead arguably needed, for optimum treatment of its subject, to include 
reduced size copies of the distinctive copyrighted concert posters that were 
used to promote the band’s concerts as historical artifacts.260 
On the other hand, when the original work and interchangeable 
equivalents are readily available through normal copyright channels, and the 
livelihoods of creators of those works are dependent on would-be users 
accessing those channels, an uncompensated taking cannot be justified as 
fair use. For instance, in Cariou, even though Prince contended Cariou’s 
images were generic and ubiquitously available, Prince simply appropriated 
Cariou’s photographs instead of seeking permission or exploring alternative 
 
 255.   See infra notes 262, 264, and accompanying text. 
 256.   See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984). 
 257.   See Gordon, supra note 207, at 1628. 
 258.   2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 12:47. 
 259.   Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 322–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 260.   Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 607, 611–13 (2d Cir. 2006). 
Notably, however, it is not clear that market failure justified the unauthorized copying of the posters 
without consent, given that the copyright owner was willing to negotiate a license, just not at a price the 
defendant was willing to pay. Id. at 607. 
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means of acquiring similar photographs without infringing anyone’s 
copyright. 
According to Professor Landes, “Commercial photographers are in the 
business of licensing reproduction rights to their photographs for a variety of 
unanticipated uses. Without copyright protection, the price of copies would 
be driven down to the cost of copying, leaving nothing to cover the cost of 
creating the work.”261 This would not only harm photographers, whose works 
are subject to widespread misappropriation exceedingly difficult to police 
and are dependent upon a functioning licensing market in order to earn a 
livelihood,262 but also secondary users, because “killing the proverbial goose 
that laid the golden egg”263 would deprive them of useable raw materials for 
their derivative works. 
Therefore, if, when considering the nature of the copyrighted work, it 
appears that it can readily, affordably and legally be obtained through easy-
to-navigate copyright channels, any need to make use of the work without 
the consent of the copyright owner disappears.264 In such cases, appropriation 
of the original work is simply copyright infringement. 
The third fair use factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used, has also been vitiated by the transformative use standard in order to 
permit copying of substantial portions of an original work if they are being 
conjured up to create something that is transformative. Restoring the 
importance of the purpose element of the first factor would reinvigorate the 
third factor because, as noted in Campbell, the amount used must be 
“reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying.”265 Thus, while 
substantial copying is necessary when the purpose is to create a parody, other 
transformative uses do not necessarily have the same blanket justification. 
One type of secondary use that can claim the need to copy the entire 
original work is an Internet search engine, as in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 
used to guide third parties to particular images. The search can only be 
facilitated by reproducing the entire image. Importantly, by making the 
 
 261.   Landes, supra note 210, at 18–19. 
 262.   See Brief for the American Photographic Artists, et al. as Amici Curiae, Cariou v. Prince, (No. 
08 Civ. 11327 (DAB)), (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 16, 2013) (Dkt. 117), at 8–9; Affidavit of Mickey 
Osterreicher, Cariou v. Prince, 08 Civ. 11327 (DAB) (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 16, 2013) (Dkt. 119), ¶¶ 5–6. 
 263.   Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 264.   See Affidavit of Megan Murphy, Cariou v. Prince, (No. 08 Civ. 11327 (DAB)), (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Dec. 16, 2013) (Dkt. 118), ¶¶ 3–4, 7 (Director of Getty Images explaining that its licensing models, like 
those of numerous other photographic archives, enabled users “to almost instantly lawfully acquire a 
license in an image of almost any imaginable subject,” including “images of Jamaica and Rastafarians,” 
such as those appropriated by Prince from Cariou). 
 265.   Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). 
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images available as low-resolution thumbnails, the search engine also cannot 
be accused of exploiting the creative virtues of or substituting for the original 
works, because if the thumbnails were downloaded and enlarged, they would 
lose their clarity.266 Therefore, no more of the original work’s aesthetic 
expression is taken than is necessary to fulfill the search engine’s purpose as 
a research tool. 
Also, because a search engine copies from numerous sources, its 
transaction costs would be exorbitant if it had to acquire licenses from each 
copyright owner. On the other hand, a secondary user who takes a substantial 
portion from only a single original work would incur much more manageable 
transaction costs, tending to disfavor fair use. According to Professor 
Goldstein, 
[T]he use of substantial portions from the copyrighted work is more likely 
to justify the expense of negotiating a license from the copyright owner 
than is the use of small excerpts. It only slightly oversimplifies the 
operation of the third factor to say that the “greater the amount of the 
copyrighted work used, the less likely it is that the fair use exception is 
applicable.”267 
The fourth fair use factor, the effect of the use upon the potential 
market, has also been constricted by the notion that, if the secondary use is 
transformative, it is theoretically less likely to usurp or supersede the market 
for the original work, since a transformative secondary work will have a 
different audience than the original.268 The Second Circuit’s recent decision 
in  Authors Guild v. Google authored by Judge Leval underscored that 
cognizable harm under the fourth factor requires the secondary use to 
completely supplant and substitute for the original work. The Court held  
“the possibility, or even the probability or certainty, of some loss of sales 
does not suffice to make the copy an effectively competing substitute that 
would tilt the weighty fourth factor in favor of the rights holder in the 
original.”269 The problem with this concept is that secondary uses, including 
“unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the 
defendant,”270 can harm the copyright owner’s potential market in a myriad 
 
 266.   Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 267.   2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 12:54. 
 268.   See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708-09 (2d. Cir. 2013). 
 269.   Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 224 (2d Cir. 2015). The decision not only referred 
to the fourth factor as being “weighty,” Id., but also seemed to resurrect the Harper & Row dictum that 
the fourth factor “‘is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.’” Id. at 214 (quoting 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)). By limiting cognizable 
harm to superseding, i.e., non-transformative, uses, however, this apparent heightened emphasis on the 
fourth fair use factor only reinforces the primacy of the transformative use standard. 
 270.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
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of unpredictable ways. Certainly, a secondary use can harm the potential 
market for the original work without usurping a precisely identical use that 
the copyright owner would have pursued.271 
The harm to potential derivative markets must also be considered, with 
the proponent of the affirmative defense of fair use shouldering the burden 
of demonstrating an absence of harm to those markets.272 Where the evidence 
demonstrates that the copyright owner would never license anyone to exploit 
a particular derivative use, the market cannot be relied upon to maximize 
value, and an uncompensated taking likely would constitute fair use. The 
Eleventh Circuit, in Cambridge Univ. Press, underscored the relevance of 
the copyright owner’s willingness to license her work: “‘[I]t is sensible that 
a particular unauthorized use should be considered ‘more fair’ when there is 
no ready market or means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use 
should be considered ‘less fair’ when there is a ready market or means to pay 
for the use.’”273 
It should not be presumed, however, that a copyright owner will only 
exploit derivative markets which she has already exploited; such a 
presumption amounts to penalizing the unsuccessful or those just starting out 
in their field. Rather, it should be incumbent upon the proponent of fair use 
to establish that particular derivative markets would not be pursued by the 
copyright owner. 
D.  Keeping the Derivative Work Right Intact 
The current state of the law of fair use can be traced back to Judge 
Leval’s indisputable observation that “all intellectual creative activity is in 
part derivative.”274 However, merely because an intended secondary use 
would be derivative or transformative does not mean that a secondary user 
 
 271.   Thus, in Cariou, a gallery owner abandoned plans for a show of Cariou’s prints not because 
Prince had put on an identical show of those prints, but, rather, because Prince’s show, even though it 
purportedly appealed to a different market, audience and price point, caused the gallery owner no longer 
to want to show Cariou’s work because “she did not want to appear to be capitalizing on Prince’s 
Paintings and did not want to show work which had been ‘done already’ at the nearby Gagosian Gallery.” 
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 344, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). See also Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. 
Supp. 2d 1144, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that any use can cause brand name fatigue and dissuade 
advertisers from licensing the original for other, unrelated uses). The fourth factor inquiry is not limited 
to whether secondary works usurp or supersede the objects of the original work; it suffices that they have 
a negative effect “upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 17 U.S.C. § 107, or 
“prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits” of the original work, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
 272.   Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590, 594. 
 273.   Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1276–77 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 
 274.   Leval, supra note 32, at 1109. 
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may, with impunity and without justification, appropriate a copyrighted 
work without paying a licensing fee. 
While using the market-based approach advocated in this article will 
maintain the copyright owner’s exclusive right and incentive to create and 
license derivative works subject to necessary fair uses due to market failure, 
the transformative use standard, by equating all transformative uses with fair 
uses, tramples on that right. In Professor Goldstein’s view, “When Congress 
in the 1976 Act brought every form of transformative use within section 
106(2)’s derivative right, it consequently left no room for the fair use 
doctrine to weigh the transformative nature of a use in the statutory 
balance.”275 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Evaluating fair use claims based on whether the secondary use is 
transformative overrides the statutory text, results in arbitrary, unpredictable 
and result-oriented outcomes, obliterates the copyright owner’s right to make 
and license derivative works and should be abandoned. Instead, fair use 
analysis should proceed pursuant to a case-by-case examination of all four 
statutory fair use factors and whether the secondary use is akin to the 
examples set forth in the statutory preamble. The fair use defense should be 
limited to cases where there is a need to copy a particular original work, but 
only where, because the market cannot be relied upon to facilitate a socially 
beneficial transfer of rights, appropriation of the original work without the 
consent of the copyright owner is required. This approach takes guidance 
from the forgotten examples in the preamble to § 107 of the Copyright Act, 
restores meaning to the neglected fair use factors explicitly set forth in the 
statute and preserves the copyright owner’s valuable exclusive right to create 
and license derivative works, without unduly stifling creative secondary uses 
that cannot be effectuated due to market imperfections. 
 
 
 275.   2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 160, at 12:36. 
